"It's a dangerous business, Frodo, going out of your door... You step into the Road, and if you don't keep your feet, there is no knowing where you might be swept off to."
--J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings

Sunday, January 30, 2011

Response: Shannon, Weaver, and Wiener

This week I am responding to “The Mathematical Theory of Communication” by Claude E Shannon and Warren Weaver and The Human Use of Human Beings, chapters 1 and 11, by Norbert Wiener.

Again, beginning with a couple informal responses.

I hate math. One of math’s favorite hobbies is to tear my brain in pieces and then stomp on them while laughing maliciously at the spurting brain juice. So I was a bit apprehensive about the Shannon and Weaver reading. But I actually found it quite interesting, and not as painful as I was afraid it would be. I was especially intrigued by the idea of “noise” as it applies to the transmission of information, and, more specifically, translation between languages. I am double majoring in English and Spanish, studying Mandarin Chinese, and planning to go onto grad school in translation studies. Languages fascinate me, as does the act of translating something said in one language into another. Noise, in this case, would be whatever discrepancies arise from structural, vocabulary, stylistic, or idiomatic differences between languages. As I believe Wiener pointed out, a translator has, broadly speaking, two options: a more direct, literal translation that maintains denotative ideas from the original language, but perhaps loses something of idiomatic meaning or style, or a broader, more liberal translation that may maintain the original tone, but that also, intentionally or unintentionally, inserts meanings and nuances that were not originally present. I would say that the job of the translator, looking at these two options (and the spectrum of choices in between), is to pick the option producing the least amount of noise.

And now, the prompt:

The Marxists we have previously read seemed concerned with the manipulation of information from a socio-political standpoint—how is information being manipulated for the political ends of the ruling class, and how can the revolutionary class counter it? Shannon, Weaver, and Wiener, seem more concerned with manipulation of information (manipulation as in “technical treatment of a given material with a particular goal in mind,” as Enzensberger defines it) from a pragmatic stance—how can we, whoever we may be, manipulate information most effectively, such that it may arrive at the receiver, be that human or machine, with the least amount of distortion occurring during the transmission process. Both articles seem concerned with the idea of information free from any sort of partisan bias. Their concern is the act of communication, especially the changes it will, should, or should not undergo in the face of the development of communicative technologies.

Shannon and Weaver focus on establishing a framework for thinking about information in quantifiable terms. I think it’s significant that they emphasize “information must not be confused with meaning” (161). This idea shifts the focus from the semantic implications of that which is communicated to the data that is transmitted.

With this framework in mind, Wiener’s writing may be understood to discuss how machines can be designed to transmit, receive, and respond to information, and therefore the role they should play in social communication. His idea of a “message” is similar to Shannon’s idea of a “signal”—a stimulus, be it verbal, visual, etc., transmitted from a transmitter to a receiver, with the end of communicating a meaning. Wiener’s concern is control, “the sending of messages which effectively change the behavior of the recipient” (8). If we put in in Shannon’s terms, control is the process of removing noise from a transmitted message: “a message can lose order spontaneously in the act of transmission, but cannot gain it” (7). In terms of machines, control becomes difficult because machines can only respond to a message in one of a predetermined set of responses. Thus, while Wiener seems enthusiastic about the potential usages of communication machines in society, he warns that it is important to determine their place. Placing machines in roles that belong to humans can be dangerous, because they cannot be appropriately controlled, but placing humans in a role that should belong to a machine, now that such machines exist, is degrading to the human.

Sunday, January 23, 2011

Response: Enzensberger and Habermas

Again, I will begin with a few informal reactions.

Habermas used several words which were rather similar, he was using them for distinct entities, and I was not quite sure of the specific definitions. What does he mean by realm, sphere, domain, and world. He seemed to used these terms to convey something different, but I couldn’t quite figure out the distinctions between them.

I am also curious about the meaning and implications of the term “avant-garde,” which has now come up in Adorno and Horkeimer, Benjamin, and Habermas. I know the basic definition of the term, and I have a series of ideas and attitudes associated with it, but I am interested in the historical context of the term in relation to how they use it—what specific artists do they consider to be avant-garde, and why.

I was intrigued by Enzensberger’s definition of “heritage” as “class-specific handing-on of nonmaterial capital” (106). Again, I basically understood the idea of heritage, but if I had been asked to define it, I would have had some trouble. This definition seems to fit the idea I had in my head, but it also offers more to ponder, like what exactly is entailed by “nonmaterial capital.” I haven’t drawn any conclusions concerning this definition, but it caught my attention, and I want to think on it more.

This week’s prompt is the following: “Despite their Marxist orientation, both Enzensberger and Habermas are generally considered more optimistic about the emancipatory potential of modern culture. What is the reason for this optimism?”

Habermas’s optimism seems to be largely historically based. He details the changes that have occurred in the platforms through which culture has been developed and the cultural trends that resulted. From the coffee houses and salons opened up opportunities for the layperson to discuss and opine about art, such that it was no longer only the elite who could do so. The institution of paid concerts, although it made music more of a commodity, allowed composers to compose what they wanted, not just whatever a patron demanded for an occasion. While Arendt would have feared the destructive consequences to the commoditization of music, Habermas identifies the ways in which this sort of commoditization actually may create space for greater creative expression on the part of the composer. By identifying the positive effects of changing cultural platforms throughout history, Habermas seems to fear future change less and seems more open for recognizing its artistic and cultural potential.

Enzensberger’s optimism seems to stem from a pragmatic recognition of the steps necessary to achieve a more egalitarian mass electronic media. He presents a quite realistic, pragmatic attitude towards the question of new media and how it should be treated. Although he is a Marxist, he clearly recognizes some of the problematic attitudes of some of his fellow left-wing thinkers towards new media. According to Enzensberger, many left-wing activists and thinkers have a tendency to write off new media as one of “the Man’s” devices, and therefore of dubious social good. For Enzensberger, this sort of attitude is counterproductive and problematic in that it doesn’t consider the potential of new media, only previous usages of it by the bourgeois; to use a cliché, this attitude “throws the baby out with the bathwater.” These left-wing activists are so repulsed by the thought of “manipulation” by the new media that they fail to realize, as Enzensberger points out, “every us of the media presupposes manipulation … The question is therefore not whether the media are manipulated, but who manipulates them” (104).

It is this pragmatic understanding of electronic media that forms the basis for Enzensberger’s optimism. With this level-headed attitude that refuses to sensationalize electronic media as a device of “the Man,” Enzensberger is able to identify what changes need to occur to the mass media to render it truly egalitarian: primarily, that it somehow to achieve a greater level of interaction and dialogue between author and audience and to deconstruct the barrier between them. I think this idea anticipates many of the developments that have occurred with internet media. Enzensberger presents radio as an example of a form of media with the potential to achieve more egalitarian communication: “Radio would be the most wonderful means of communication imaginable in public life, a huge linked system—that is to say, it would be such if it were capable not only of transmitting but of receiving, of allowing the listener not only to hear but to speak, and did not isolate him but brought him into contact” (98). This idea anticipates such developments as the live podcast, in which the hosts use a platform like UStream or BlogTV to record a radio show live, during which listeners may call in to contribute or converse about what is being said in a live chat box. Similar developments like YouTube, web forums, and blogs also allow for a greater level of interaction between author and audience.

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Response: Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt

First, I will start off with a few informal reactions.

I found Benjamin easier to read than Adorno and Horkeimer, as far as the language goes. However, as Kerry McAuliffe remarked to me, and I agree with her, he seems to use some words in a very specific, defined sense, and I was not entirely sure I understood all the implications of his usages of these words. These terms include “progressive” as it refers to literary technique, “phantasmagoria,” and “fetish.” I hope we might be able to go over these terms some in class so I can get a better grasp on precisely what he meant.

I was also unclear on his position towards fascism. Perhaps my understanding of fascism is somewhat faulty, but I had thought of fascism and communism as opposites, and Benjamin seems to support some of the ideas of Marx. But at other times, he refers to “the privilege of fascism,” as though he were praising it.

Now, on to the prompt.

For Arendt, there seem to be two types of intellectuals in society. The function of the first is to take objects of culture and figure out how to adapt them to prevailing societal trends such that they are more universally palatable and consumable. She refers in one instance to this first group as a “special kind of intellectual” (284). The second , which she categorizes as being in a state of malaise, is the type that wishes to preserve objects of culture. This type exists in conflict with those “professionals” who “fabricate” books rather than write them (284). This double and apparently self-contradictory usage of the word “intellectual” may reflect some degree of the prevailing confusion between culture and entertainment about which Arendt writes.

Benjamin uses the term “intellectual” in a rather more specific sense. He references Hiller’s definition of the intellectual as “representatives of a certain characterological type”, a type which transcends class, in that belonging to a specific class is not necessary for consideration as an intellectual (although, he does provide the caveat that members of the bourgeoisie have greater access to the means of production that help to facilitate becoming an intellectual” (84). The intellectual is defined by a shared set of “opinions, attitudes, or dispositions” (85). Benjamin states that, as an intellectual does not necessarily belong to one class or another, the position of the intellectual in society is determined “on the basis of is position in the process of production” (85). I understand “production” to refer to the act, craft, or process through which a work of art—in this case, literature—is created or written; in other words, it refers to the literary techniques used to convey an idea. Thus, it is not enough that a work merely promote revolutionary ideas; it must do so in a way that actively engages the process of production, using various techniques not merely from habit or tradition but because the author “has reflected deeply on the conditions of present-day production” (89). An intellectual only becomes part of the revolutionary class if he is also a producer in the sense that he engages these means of production, not merely regurgitates revolutionary rhetoric.

Saturday, January 15, 2011

Honors 3013: The social construction of new media

Hello, all. [Insert requisite comment about how I am terrible at blogging]. I promise, I didn't drop off the face of the earth. I am just negligent when it comes to blogging/journalling/whatever. However, I will be putting this blog in use again. I am taking an Honors class this semester about, as the title implies, new media, the internet, the role it plays in our culture, how we interact with new media, etc. One of the requirements for this class is that we post weekly blog responses to our readings. I decided to use this blog for that purpose rather than creating a new one because 1.) I'd rather have just one blog account and 2.) these issues are topics I like to think about, so I may want to save these responses for future reference. For those of you who have been following me to hear about my travels, these posts might be of little interest, so I will certainly not be offended if you don't read them.

I am excited about this class, because, like I said, I like to think about these topics, but I don't always feel that I am intellectually equipped to think well about them. I hope this class will give me said intellectual equipment to contemplate these ideas more thoroughly.